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11. introduction
Consider the standard nonlinear pricing monopoly problem (Mussa and Rosen (1978)).
A monopolist o¤ers a price-quantity menu to a single privately-informed buyer with a
quasi-linear utility. The traditional framework takes information as exogenously given. In
reality, a seller can a¤ect the information of the buyer by adopting certain policies such as
relying on an outside certi…er of quality or structuring the information system such that
data on past buyers become publicly available. Similar policies could be enacted in other
monopoly problems, such as franchising or procurement. In this paper, we ask whether
committing to reveal an additional signal increases the monopolist’s expected pro…t.
This problem is closely related to the one solved by Milgrom and Weber (1982). They
consider an auctioneer selling a single good to several asymmetrically informed bidders
and they ask whether the seller gains by adopting a policy of revealing an additional pub-
lic signal about the good. According to their so-called linkage principle, in an a¢liated
environment the expected revenue of the seller is increased by such a transparency policy.
While Milgrom and Weber’s seller operates with an exogenously given mechanism (a cer-
tain auction format), our monopolist must change the price-quantity schedule in response
to the additional signal.
We show that the logic of the linkage principle extends to the monopoly problem. The
monopolist’s expected pro…t cannot decrease if she commits to revealing a signal a¢liated
to the buyer’s private signal. We prove this result for two scenarios according to what
happens if the additional signal is not revealed. In the …rst case, the monopolist does not
have access to the signal unless it is made public. In the second and perhaps more realistic
case, the monopolist obtains it privately in case it is not revealed to the buyer.
Consider the comparison of public with no information. Revealing a public signal
has two e¤ects. Firstly, for any …xed quantity vector a buyer who receives an additional
a¢liated signal …nds local downward deviations less attractive on average. The monopolist
can then sell on average at higher prices. Secondly, the monopolist can further increase
expected pro…ts by conditioning the quantities o¤ered on the realization of the public
signal. A¢liation is crucial for the linkage principle to hold. We report simple examples
in which a¢liation fails and revealing a public signal hurts the monopolist.
The alternative to public information revelation is often for the monopolist to have
private access to the same information. For example, a manufacturer selling to a new
retailer has access to data on the …nal demand for the product which can be publicly
disclosed. When does the principal prefer an honesty policy of always revealing directly
itsown private information? In orderto compare public information toprivate information,
1we examine the case where the monopolist is privately informed at the contracting stage.
This is a particular agency problem with an informed principal (Myerson (1983), Maskin
and Tirole (1990) and (1992)). In equilibrium, the buyer may infer (part of) the private
information of the monopolist from the menu o¤ered (see e.g. Judd and Riordan (1994)).
We show that the monopolist gains by committing to reveal directly the part of information
that is revealed indirectly by the menu choice. This is because indirect revelation creates
a con‡ict between the di¤erent types of principals which leads to distortions in the choice
of menus. With a similar logic, the monopolist is better o¤ committing to ‘forget’ the part
of information that is not revealed in equilibrium. Public full revelation is shown to be
the best policy.
Our results are valid also when the buyer’s private signal and the public signal provide
information also on the seller’s cost of production or opportunity cost, as in Akerlof’s
(1970) market for lemons. We also allow the signals to provide information on the buyer’s
outside option.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 de…nes the environment. Section 3 compares
public to no information, and Section 4 public to private information. Section 5 discusses
the applications and Section 6 concludes.
2. environment
A monopolist wishes to sell to a single buyer. For notational simplicity, the supports of
all random variables are taken to be …nite: The state of the world, unknown to both the
buyer and the seller, is represented by the real random variable S with support S. The
private information of the buyer is represented by the real valued random variable T with
support T = ft1;::: ;tng, where without loss t1 < ::: < tn. The additional signal Z with
support Z is allowed to be multi-dimensional. The random variables S;T;Z are assumed
to be a¢liated (cf. Milgrom and Weber (1982)). When Z is unidimensional, a¢liation





















Let Q be a …nite set of nonnegative real numbers. For concreteness, we interpret q 2 Q
as quantity, but we could also view it as quality. Both buyer and seller have quasi-linear
preferences. In state s, the total pro…t of the monopolist of providing quantity q for a
non-linear price transfer p is v(q;s) + p. No assumption is made on the function v. The














2with strict inequality whenever s00 > s0 and q00 > q0.
Our framework encompasses a number of monopoly markets. In a more familiar for-
mulation of the non-linear monopoly pricing model, u(q;s) = qs and v(q;s) = ¡c(q). A
buyer with private signal tj has type E[Sjtj] equal to the marginal willingness to pay for
quantity. In the special case with Q = f0;1g, we have the classic model of monopoly pric-
ing for a single unit, where the demand function at price p = E[Sjtj] is equal to Pr(T ¸ ti).
More generally, v(q;s) depends on s to allow the buyer to have private information on
the opportunity value of the item for the seller. Our model therefore covers monopoly
pricing in the lemons market. Clearly, the role of buyer and seller can be reversed, with
the caveat that the uninformed party has all the bargaining power, and therefore optimally
chooses the mechanism to o¤er to the informed party. This is also a special case of the
procurement problem with endogenous quality of Manelli and Vincent (1995) with only
one seller. In Akerlof’s (1970) original setup Q = f0;1g, we look at the problem of the
(monopsonistic) buyer who makes the price o¤er to a partially informed seller.
The buyer’s expected payo¤, gross of the price paid, conditional on tj and z is




when buying quantity qi. A¢liation and supermodularity interplay nicely. Supermodular-
ity of u in q;s and a¢liation of S and T conditional on Z imply that
U(q;t;z) is supermodular in q;t (2)
for any z. This is veri…ed immediately by making use of Milgrom’s (1981) Proposition 1.
Similarly, supermodularity of u in q;s and a¢liation of S and Z conditional on T implies
that
U(q;t;z) is supermodular in q;z (3)
for any t.
Timing of events is as follows: First, an information regime ischosen. We consider three
information regimes. While the buyer always observes the private signal T, observation of
Z depends on the information regime: (a) No Information: neither the monopolist nor the
buyer observes Z; (b) Public Information: both parties observe Z; (c) Private Information:
only the monopolist observes Z. Second, observation of the signals take place, according
to the information regime. Third, the monopolist proposes a menu of quantity-price pairs
to the buyer. Fourth, the buyer selects a quantity-price pair within the menu o¤ered by
the seller or takes the outside option (p = 0, q = 0).
33. public information versus no information
This section compares public information to no information. Before making the pricing
decision, the monopolist decides whether the signal Z should be made available to both
himself and the buyer. The alternative to revelation is that no one observes the signal.
Which policy results in higher pro…ts?
The change in pro…ts due to the addition of public information can be decomposed
in two e¤ects. First, holding constant the quantities sold to each type of buyer and
optimizing only on price transfers, expected pro…ts can either increase or decrease when
the public signal is available. Second, the monopolist can further increase the expected
pro…ts by conditioning quantities on the realization of the public signal. In order to
obtain an unambiguous comparison of pro…ts, we identify a condition under which the
…rst comparison is unambiguous.
With public information, the monopolist isallowed to o¤era di¤erent menu of contracts
hq(z);p(z)i = hqi (z);pi(z)i
n
i=0 depending on the realization z of the random variable Z.
Consider the choice of the buyer who is o¤ered such a price-quantity schedule in state
z. The expected payo¤ (conditional on z) from qi (z);pi (z) for the buyer who observes
realization tj of the private signal T and z of the public signal Z, is U (qi (z);tj;z)¡pi (z).
The monopolist’s maximal expected pro…t is denoted by ¼(Z;fT;Zg) (to indicate that
the monopolist’s information set is Z and the buyer’s is fT;Zg) and is given by








Pr(ti;z;s)(v(qi(z);s) + pi(z)) (4)
subject to the individual rationality and incentive compatibility constraints
U(qi(z);ti;z) ¡pi(z) ¸ U(0;ti;z) 8i
U(qi(z);ti;z) ¡pi(z) ¸ U(qk (z);ti;z) ¡ pk (z) 8i;8k:
Each non-excluded type ti selects the contract qi(z);pi(z) designed for that type. We deal
with the individual rationality constraints with the convention that the menu of contracts
o¤ered by the monopolist must always include the null contract q0(z) ´ p0(z) ´ 0,
which provides the outside option to the buyer. A vector q = (q0;::: ;qn) is said to be
implementable if there exists a vector p = (p0;::: ;pn) such that hq;pi satis…es for all i
and k
U(qi(z);ti;z) ¡pi(z) ¸ U(qk (z);ti;z) ¡pk (z): (ICi;k)
We now report the characterization of the solution of the monopolist problem, restating
well-known results (e.g. Maskin and Riley (1984)) in our setting. A¢liation of T and S
4and supermodularity of u(q;s) allow us to restrict attention to menus for which the local
downward constraints are always binding:
Proposition 1 Let U(q;t;z) be strictly supermodular in q and t for any z. Then: (i) q is
implementable if and only if it is monotonic, q0 · ¢¢¢ · qn; (ii) Given an implementable q,
at a pro…t maximizing price vector p, the local downward incentive compatibility constraints
are binding,
pi = pi¡1 + U(qi;ti;z) ¡ U(qi¡1;ti;z) 8i; (5)
with p0 ´ 0.
Proof. See the Appendix. ¤
The monopolist’s problem is not …nite because price is a continuous variable. Never-
theless, Proposition 1 guarantees that, for every z, the problem has a solution because
each q yields a unique optimal price vector, and Q is …nite.
The problem without public information is identical to that with a completely unin-
formative public signal Z = ;. Abusing notation, the buyer’s expected payo¤ conditional
on tj is




where we have dropped the functional dependence on the uniformative realizations of ;.
The maximal expected pro…t for the monopolist is






Pr(ti;z)(v(qi (z);s) + pi) (6)
subject to hq;pi being implementable.
The monopolist achieves higher expected pro…ts in the presence of public a¢liated
information:
Theorem 1 If S;T;Z are a¢liated random variables, the monopolist achieves higher ex-
pected pro…ts by publicly revealing Z, ¼ (Z;fT;Zg) ¸ ¼ (;;T).
We prove this result by showing that there is a suboptimal but feasible strategy which
allows the monopolist to achieve higher expected pro…ts once the additional a¢liated signal
is publicly reavealed. Suppose that the monopolist continues to o¤er the quantity vector
which was optimal in the absence of information and appropriately modi…es the prices
5in response to the realization of the public information. It is shown that this possibly
suboptimal strategy results in higher expected pro…ts under the a¢liation assumption.
Let h^ q; ^ pi be a menu of contracts which solves the seller’s problem with no public infor-
mation. Because ^ q is implementable with no information, the necessity part of Proposition
1 (i) implies that ^ q is nondecreasing. Since ^ q is nondecreasing and U(q;t;z) is supermod-
ular in q;t given any z, the su¢ciency part of Proposition 1 (i) guarantees that ^ q is
implementable for any realization z of the public signal.
Next, consider the case with public information and suppose that, for each z the seller
o¤ers menu h^ q; ~ p(z)i, where ~ p(z) is de…ned by
~ pi(z) = ~ pi¡1(z) + U(^ qi;ti;z) ¡U(^ qi¡1;ti;z) 8i (7)
with ~ p0(z) ´ 0. Obviously, while h^ q; ^ pi is optimal for the seller in the case with no
information, h^ q; ~ p(z)i need not be optimal in the case with public information because, in
general, the monopolist can do better by letting q depend on z.
The following statistical property will be useful:
Lemma 1 Take any qj¡1 · qj. The expected marginal utility of type tj from buying qj
rather than qj¡1 for all j · i in the absence of public information is (weakly) lower than
its expectation with respect to the a¢liated signal Z conditional on information ti:
X
z2Z
Pr(zjti)(U(qj;tj;z) ¡U(qj¡1;tj;z)) ¸ U(qj;tj) ¡ U(qj¡1;tj) 8j · i: (8)
Proof. By supermodularity (3), U(qj;tj;z) ¡ U(qj¡1;tj;z) is non-decreasing in z. Af-








for all j · i. Using the de…nitions and the law of total probabilities, we have
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z2Z














The result follows. ¤
The following thought experiment is useful to interpret this result. Suppose that all
the di¤erent quantities were sold at the same price. Consider a local downward deviation
6for the buyer with type j = i. Type ti’s utility loss when buying the quantity designed for
the type immediately below is equal to U(qj;tj;z) ¡ U(qj¡1;tj;z). As shown in the proof
of the lemma, the expected cost of this deviation in the presence of public information is
the same as the cost in the absence of public information. The lemma shows that in the
eyes of type i the expected cost of a local deviation by all lower types j · i is higher with
public information than without.
Applying Lemma 1 to ^ q and substituting (5) and (7) into (8) we obtain
X
z2Z
Pr(zjti)(~ pj(z) ¡ ~ pj¡1(z)) ¸ ^ pj ¡ ^ pj¡1 8j · i: (10)
Now, …x i and sum (10) from j = 1 to j = i. As ~ p0(z) = ^ p0 = 0, we have
X
z2Z
Pr(zjti) ~ pi(z) ¸ ^ pi 8i: (11)
When selling the same quantities to the same buyer types, the monopolist can charge on
average higher prices for each type once public information is revealed. Higher prices are
incentive compatible because the expected cost of a local deviation is higher with public
information than without, as guaranteed by Lemma 1.
We are now ready for the proof of Theorem 1:















Pr(ti;z;s)(v(^ qi;s) + ~ pi(z))













































(11) guarantees that this last inequality holds. ¤
If the monopolist does not alter the quantity vector, the expected value of the social
welfare u(q;s) + v(q;s) remains constant. However, the presence of public information
makes local downward deviations more costly and allows the monopolist to charge higher
prices. The cake is the same, but the monopolist gets a larger slice under the a¢liation
assumption.
Our result can be strengthened by showing that the monopolist cannot do better with
any other policy of partial information disclosure. A policy of partial information disclosure
corresponds to revelation of an experiment W, which is Blackwell less informative than Z.
If Z is a more informative experiment than (or Blackwell su¢cient for) W, the conditional
distribution of S and T given Z and W is identical to the conditional distribution of S
and T given Z only. We establish the following simple result on a¢liation:
Lemma 2 Assume that S, T, and Z are a¢liated random variables, and W is Blackwell
less informative than Z. Then S, T, and Z are a¢liated conditional on W.
Proof. We have




where the …rst and third equalities are due to the de…nition of conditional probability
and the second to the above-mentioned su¢ciency property. Next, substitute (12) in the











The result then follows from the assumption that S, T, and Z are a¢liated. ¤
Theorem 1 can be applied repeatedly, once part W of the information contained in Z
has become public. Regardless of the information W which has already become public,
making public the remaining information contained in Z cannot hurt the seller. As this
holds for any possible realization, it holds also ex ante:
8Theorem 2 The monopolist achieves a higher expected pro…t by publicly revealing signal
Z than by publicly revealing signal W Blackwell less informative than Z, ¼(Z;fT;Zg) ¸
¼ (W;fT;Wg).
Proof. Lemma2 guarantees that S, T, and Z area¢liated conditionally on any realization
of W. For any given realization w, all the conditions of Theorem 1 are veri…ed, so that
committing to reveal Z is pro…table. Then, this is also true taking expectation over W.
Therefore, publicly revealing both W and Z is more pro…table than revealing only W,
¼ (fZ;Wg;fT;Z;Wg) ¸ ¼(W;fT;Wg). Finally, ¼ (fZ;Wg;fT;Z;Wg) = ¼ (Z;fT;Zg)
because revealing both W and Z is equivalent to revealing only Z, Blackwell su¢cient for
W. ¤
3.1 Welfare of the Buyer
Revelation of a¢liated public information has an ambiguous e¤ect on the expected
payo¤ of the buyer. Clearly, when a perfectly informative signal is revealed publicly, the
buyer is necessarily (weakly) worse o¤, being deprived of all informational rent. When
the quantity vector is held …xed, public information results in a reduction of the rent
of each type of buyer. Nevertheless, the buyer may bene…t from the introduction of
a¢liated information, once the quantity vector o¤ered is optimally re-adjusted by the
monopolist in response to the a¢liated public signal. This is illustrated in the single unit
problem (Q = f0;1g) with u(q;s) = sq, v(q;s) = ¡cq, with two ex-ante equally likely
states s1 = 0 and s2 = 1, and symmetric binary signals (Pr(t1js1) = Pr(t2js2) = ¿ and
Pr(z1js1) = Pr(z2js2) = ³). Set c = 7=10, ¿ = 6=10, and ³ = 9=10. Without public
information no sale occurs (^ q1 = ^ q2 = 0), resulting in zero rent for the buyer. With
public information, ^ q1(z2) = ^ q2(z2) = 1 and ^ p1(z2) = ^ p2(z2) = E [Sjt1;z2] = 6=7, as
E [Sjt1;z2] ¡ c = 11=70 > 67=500 = Pr(t2jz2)[E [Sjt2;z2] ¡c]. Type t2 buyer enjoys the
positive rent E [Sjt2;z2]¡E [Sjt1;z2] = 15=203 when z2 is realized, and zero rent otherwise.
3.2 Social Welfare
Similarly, the e¤ect of a¢liated public information on the expected value of the sum of
the payo¤s of the buyer and the seller is ambiguous. Clearly, a perfectly informative public
signal cannot decrease total welfare. However, a partially informative signal may decrease
it by inducing the seller to choose a more distortive quantity schedule, in order to extract
more rent fromthe buyer. Considerthe binary one unit example of the previoussubsection,
with c = 0, ¿ = 5=8, and ³ = 19=20. Without public information, the monopolist does
not exclude the low type (^ q1 = ^ q2 = 1 and ^ p1 = ^ p2 = 3=8), thereby implementing the
9socially optimal allocation with expected social welfare 1=2. With public information,
exclusion of the low type (^ q1(z1) = ^ p1(z1) = 0) is optimal for the monopolist when z1 is
realized, as E [Sjt1;z1] = 3=98 < 1=32 = Pr(t2jz1)E [Sjt2;z1]. The resulting social welfare
is Pr(z1)Pr(t2jz1)E [Sjt2;z1] + Pr(z2)E [Sjz2] = 157=320 < 1=2:
3.3 When A¢liation Fails
One might think that the monopolist would always pro…t from revealing a public signal,
because she erodes the buyer’s rent by reducing the informational asymmetry. We now
show that this is not the case. A public signal which is not a¢liated to the valuation can
actually result in lower pro…ts for the monopolist.
We have used the following four implications of a¢liation of S, T, and Z: (i) U(^ qj;t)¡
U(^ qj¡1;t) is a nondecreasing function of t, due to a¢liation of S and T; (ii) U(^ qj;t;z) ¡
U(^ qj¡1;t;z) is a nondecreasing function of t for given z, due to a¢liation of S and T
conditional on any z; (iii) U(^ qj;t;z) ¡ U(^ qj¡1;t;z) is an increasing function of z for given
t, due to a¢liation of Z and S conditional on any t; and (iv) T is a¢liated to Z. Fact (i)
guarantees monotonicity of the optimal quantity schedule ^ q. Fact (ii) combined with part
(ii) of Proposition 1 guarantees that ^ q is implementable for any realization of the public
signal z. Facts (iii) and (iv) allow us to establish our comparison by means of (9). Indeed,
if either of these three a¢liation assumptions (the one needed for (i) is su¢cient for (ii))
is violated, the monopolist may lose from committing to reveal public information. We
give three counterexample to Theorem 1, where we relax one at a time each of the these
three crucial a¢liation conditions. In all these examples the monopolist can sell zero or
one unit at no cost: Q = f0;1g, v(q;s) ´ 0, u(q;s) = qs.
Example 1. Relaxing a¢liation of Z and S. Consider three equally likely states,
fs1 = 10;s2 = 11;s3 = 12g, a binary private signal T a¢liated to S with Pr(t1js1) =
Pr(t1js2) = 1 and Pr(t2js3) = 1, and a binary public signal Z not a¢liated to S with
Pr(z1js1) = Pr(z1js3) = 1 and Pr(z2js2) = 1. Furthermore, Z and T are independent
conditionally on S, and therefore a¢liated conditionally on S and unconditionally. All the
a¢liation conditions used in the proof of Theorem 1 are satis…ed, other than a¢liation
of Z and S conditional on some t. With no public information, the monopolist has three
implementable quantity choices (q1 = q2 = 0), (q1 = 0;q2 = 1), and (q1 = q2 = 1). The
…rst yields maximal expected pro…t zero, the second 12/3, and the third 21/2 (by setting
p1 = p2 = E[Sjt1] = 21=2). With public information the expected pro…t if (q1 = q2 = 1)
(which is clearly always optimal) is equal to E[Sjt1;z1] = 10 with probability 2/3 and
10E[Sjt2;z2] = 11 with probability 1/3. Hence, the expected pro…t is lower than 21/2 and
the monopolist is worse o¤ with revelation of public information.
Example 2. Relaxing a¢liation of T and S. The monopolist is worse o¤ by committing
to reveal the public signal Z0 a¢liated to the valuation S, when the private signal T 0 of the
buyer is not a¢liated to S. Take Z0 = T and T0 = Z of the previous example. Now, the
only assumption not satis…ed is a¢liation of T and S conditional on some z. In this case,
pro…t without public information are E [Sjt0
1] = E [Sjt0
2] = 11. With public information,






2] = 20=3 + 12=3 < 11.
Example 3. Relaxing a¢liation of Z and T In this example Z and S are a¢liated
conditional on t, T and S are a¢liated conditional on z, but Z and T are not a¢liated. Un-
like the previous examples, we need Z and T not independent conditional on S. Consider
two equally likely states, fs1 = 10;s2 = 11g. The private signal T alone is uninformative
about S: there are two possible realizations, with Pr(tjs1) = Pr(tjs2) = 1=2 for t = 0;1.
In the absence of public information, maximal pro…ts are equal to 21=2. Consider the
e¤ect of the public signal Z = S ¡ T. By observing both Z and T, the buyer can in-
fer the state perfectly. With revelation of Z, the expected pro…t for the monopolist is
(3=4)10 + (1=4)11 < 21=2.
4. public versus private information
In the previous section we have compared regime G(Z;fT;Zg) where both the seller
and the buyer observe Z to regime G(;;T) where neitherthe seller nor the buyerobserve Z.
In this section we compare the equilibria and pro…ts in G(Z;fT;Zg) and G(Z;T). While
in both G(;;T) and G(Z;fT;Zg), the monopolist has no informational advantage over
the buyer when she proposes the contract, G(Z;T) is a principal-agent problem with an
informed principal and an informed agent. When both privately informed, the monopolist
and the buyer are playing a principal-agent game with an informed principal (Myerson
(1983) and Maskin and Tirole (1990, 1992)).
Note that, if Z were a veri…able signal, a standard unraveling argument (e.g. Milgrom
(1981)) would guarantee that in equilibrium Z is fully revealed to the buyer. Hence, a
veri…able private signal is equivalent to a public signal, which we have already analyzed.
For the remaining of the section, we assume that Z is not veri…able.
A menu of contracts M is a collection of quantity-price pairs (q;p) with q 2 Q and
p 2 [0;1), containing the null contract (0;0). Let M be the collection of all possible M’s.
The monopolist’s action consists of selecting M 2 M. Given M, the buyer’s action is a
choice (q;p) 2 M.
11By choosing a menu, the monopolist may reveal some of her information to the buyer.
Following Maskin and Tirole (1990), we focus on perfect Bayesian equilibria. As will
become obvious later, our results hold a fortiori if we impose re…nements.
In order to de…ne perfect Bayesian equilibria, we introduce mixed strategies and beliefs.
Given the monopolist’s private information z, let ¹(Mjz) be the probability that the
monopolist o¤ers menu M. Given that the buyer observes t and is o¤ered menu M, let
¾((q;p)jM;t) be the probability that he selects the quantity-price pair (q;p). To avoid
unnecessary complications, we restrict the monopolist to randomize between only a …nite
number of menus for each realization of z, and to o¤er menus containing only a …nite
number of price-quantity pairs.1 The buyer also uses the information he has to form
a belief on the monopolist’s ‘type’. Given menu M and signal t, let ¯(zjM;t) be the
probability that the buyer assigns on the monopolist having observed signal z.
Similarly to the de…nition of U, let V(q;t;z) =
P
s2S Pr(sjt;z)v(q;s). A perfect
Bayesian equilibrium (PBE) e of G(Z;T) is a triple (¹¤;¾¤;¯
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~ z2Z ¹¤(Mj~ z)Pr(~ zjt)
8z;8M 2 M
¤(z);8t: (16)
Let ¼e(Z;T) be the expected pro…t of the monopolist in equilibrium e.2
1Formally, let K and L be two positive natural numbers. A menu M is de…ned as a collection of less
than K quantity-price pairs (q;p). The mixed strategy ¹ of the monopolist must be such that, for each z,
at most L menus are played with positive probability.
2We choose to de…ne (MBR) in pure strategies and (BBR) in mixed strategies for notational con-
venience. The restriction to pure-strategy deviations in (MBR) is without loss of generality. If there
exists a pro…table deviation in mixed strategies, then there exists a pro…table deviation in one of the pure
strategies in the support.
12In a perfect Bayesian equilibrium of G(Z;T) the buyer may infer information about
Z from the monopolist’s choice of menu. We show that the monopolist is better o¤
by committing to reveal directly the information inferred by the buyer and to forget the
information that she does not use in equilibrium. For this purpose, it is useful to de…ne the
implicit signal We revealed by e. The (…nite) set of menus o¤ered with positive probability
in e is M¤ =
S
z2Z M¤(z). Assign to each element of M¤ a di¤erent index we 2 We,
where We is a set with the same cardinality of M¤. Hence, M¤(we) denotes a menu of
contracts which is chosen in equilibrium with positive probability and is indexed with we.
De…ne the random variable We with support We and conditional probability
Pr(We = wejz) = ¹
¤(M
¤(we)jz) 8z;8we:
The random variable We is the implicit signal on Z that the monopolist produces
through her choice of menu. Clearly, We cannot be more informative than Z (on S and
T) in the sense of Blackwell. If the PBE under consideration is separating, then We is
su¢cient statistics for Z. If the e is pooling, then We is uninformative. In partially
revealing equilibria, We is informative but less so than Z.
Given a PBE e of G(Z;T), consider G(We;fT;Weg), that is, the game in which the
monopolist observes We and the buyer observes both We and T. As the monopolist has no
private information, this is a straightforward principal-agent problem with an uninformed
principal. Because the agent forms no beliefs, the conditions for a PBE are the same as
the conditions for a subgame-perfect equilibrium. The set of expected pro…ts that the
monopolist can reach in a PBE is equal to the set of expected pro…ts that she can reach in
a subgame perfect equilibrium. In turn, as is well known from the principal-agent theory,
the maximum expected pro…t of this set is equal to the value of a maximization problem
in which the monopolist chooses both her strategy and the agent’s strategy, subject to the
agent’s strategy being a best response. There is no loss of generality in assuming that both
parties play pure strategies. However, it is convenient for our proofs to allow the buyer
to use a mixed strategy. A pure strategy for a monopolist is the choice of a (…nite) menu
º(w) 2 M given for each realization of signal w. A mixed strategy for the buyer consists
of assigning probability ¿((q;p)jM;t;w) of selecting the price-quantity pair (q;p) from the









Pr(t;w)¿((q;p)jM;t;w)[V(q;t;w) + p] (17)
subject to buyer’s best response
X
(q;p)2M
¿((q;p)jM;t;w)[U(q;t;w) ¡p] ¸ U(q;t;w) ¡ p 8t;8w;8M;8(q;p) 2 M (18)
13As we saw in the previous section, this problem can be reduced to a …nite problem and
thus has a solution. Moreover, ¼(We;fT;Weg) is equal to the maximal expected pro…t the
monopolist can obtain in a PBE of G(We;fT;Weg). We now show that this value cannot
be lower than ¼e(Z;T).
Theorem 3 Let e be a PBE of G(Z;T) and We the corresponding implicit signal. The
expected pro…t that the monopolist can achieve if We is revealed directly is higher than the
expected pro…t in e: ¼(We;fT;Weg) ¸ ¼e(Z;T).
Proof. Three preliminary results will prove useful:
Claim 1: ¯











~ z2Z Pr(wj~ z)Pr(~ zjt)
=
Pr(wjt;z)Pr(zjt) P









where the third equality is because W is less informative than Z.
Claim 2:
P
z2Z Pr(zjw;t)[U(q;t;z) ¡ p] = U(q;t;w) ¡ p 8t;8w;8z.
Check: By the de…nition of U,
X
z2Z





















Pr(sjt;w)[u(q;s) ¡ p] = U(q;t;w) ¡ p
Claim 3:
P
z2Z Pr(wjt;z)Pr(t;z)[V(q;t;z) + p] = Pr(t;w)[V(q;t;w) + p] 8t;8w:
14Check: By the de…nition of V,
X
z2Z


























= Pr(t;w)[V(q;t;w) + p]
Let (º±;¿±) be a solution of the monopolist problem (17). De…ne (^ º;^ ¿) as follows:




¾¤((q;p)jM;t) if M = M¤(w)
¿±((q;p)jM;t;w) otherwise 8w;8t;8M
Let ^ ¼ indicate the expected pro…t the monopolist gets if she plays ^ º and the buyer
plays ^ ¿. We prove the theorem by showing that ¼e(Z;T) = ^ ¼ · ¼(We;fT;Weg).
To show that ^ ¼ · ¼(We;fT;Weg), it is su¢cient to prove that (^ º;^ ¿) satis…es (18). To















¤(w);t)[U(q;t;z) ¡ p] 8(q;p) 2 M
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Pr(zjw;t)[U(q;t;z) ¡ p] 8(q;p) 2 M
¤(w)









Pr(zjw;t)[U(q;t;z) ¡ p] 8(q;p) 2 ^ º(w)
15By Claim 2, the latter reduces to
X
(q;p)2^ º(w)
^ ¿((q;p)j^ º(w);t;w)[U(q;t;w) ¡ p] ¸ U(q;t;w) ¡ p 8(q;p) 2 ^ º(w);
which means that, given t and w, if M = ^ º(w), then ^ ¿ satis…es (18). If M 6= ^ º(w), then ^ ¿
satis…es (18) because ¿± satis…es it by de…nition.






















































Pr(t;w) ^ ¿((q;p)j^ º(w);t;w)[V(q;t;w) + p] = ^ ¼
where the second equality is due to the de…nition of w, the third is due to the fact that
We is less informative than Z, the fourth comes from the de…nition of (^ º;^ ¿), and the …fth
is due to Claim 3. ¤
Intuitively, revealing information directly imposes less constraints on the monopolist
than letting the buyer infer it. In the latter case, there are constraints across types of
monopolists, corresponding to all possible realizations w of W. In order to di¤erentiate
herself from other types, a certain type of monopolist may have to choose a menu which
is suboptimal given the implicit signal sent. This cannot occur if the implicit signal is
revealed directly and the monopolist has no residual information.
It is useful to examine the two extreme cases of completely informative and completely
uninformative equilibria. If e is a pooling equilibrium, Theorem 3 says that the monopolist
is better o¤ not knowing something rather than knowing it and not using it in equilibrium.
The unused knowledge does not help her extract rent from the buyer but may constrain her
choice of menu. If e is a separating equilibrium, the monopolist’s choice of menu reveals all
her information to the buyer. However, if this information were already publicly available,
it would still be used and the incentive-compatibility constraints across monopolist types
would not need to be satis…ed.
Note that if e is a separating equilibrium, the expected pro…t in e is lower than
¼(Z;fT;Zg), in which case themonopolist isbettero¤ revealingherprivatesignal (whether
16or not the signal is a¢liated). If e is not a fully separating equilibrium, we still need to
show that ¼(Z;fT;Zg) ¸ ¼(We;fT;Weg), which, however, is an immediate consequence
of Theorem 2 (but requires a¢liation). The main result of this section is:
Theorem 4 In an a¢liated environment, the monopolist increases her expected pro…ts by
committing to reveal her private information, ¼ (Z;fT;Zg) ¸ ¼ (Z;T).
Proof. For e 2 E(Z;T), ¼e(Z;T) · ¼(We;fT;Weg) by Theorem 3. Theorem 2 then
implies ¼(We;fT;Weg) · ¼(Z;fT;Zg), as We is a garbling of Z. We conclude that for all
e 2 E(Z;T), ¼e(Z;T) · ¼ (Z;fT;Zg). ¤
4.1 Discussion
We have assumed that the payments required by the monopolist from the buyer cannot
depend on the ex-post realizations of the monopolist’sprivate information. When contracts
with payment contingent on the realization of such information are allowed, the seller
might be better o¤ not making public such information. In the spirit of the example
contained in Section 7 of Myerson (1981), the monopolist could exploit the correlation of
thisinformation with that of the buyerin order toachieve higherpro…ts than in the absence
of information or with information ex-ante publicly available also to the buyer. While the
literature on rent extraction typically considers the case where correlated information is
possessed by other agents (see Crémer and McLean (1985) and McAfee and Reny (1992) for
important developments), here the problemis complicated by the fact that this information
is possessed by the monopolist herself. An important di¤erence with the case considered
in this literature on rent extraction in the presence of correlated information is that the
seller observes the realization of Z before o¤ering the menu of contracts to the seller.
A privately informed principal might then signal such information by its choice of mech-
anism. According to the inscrutability principle of Myerson (1983), with general mech-
anisms the principal should never need to communicate any information to the agent(s)
by her choice of mechanism, because such communication can always be built into the
mechanism itself. This is not the case in the restricted class of mechanisms we allow. (?)
Maskin and Tirole (1990, 1992) further analyzed the principal-agent problem with
privately informed principal. They distinguish between common values (the general case)
and private values (in which the information of the principal does not directly a¤ect the
agent’s payo¤). They also distinguish between the generic case and the quasi-linear case,
in which the payo¤s of both the principal and the agent are separable in money. The
present model can be seen as a Maskin-Tirole problem with common values and quasi-
linear payo¤s.
17Maskin and Tirole (1990, Proposition 1) have a result that appears to go in the opposite
direction from ours. They …nd that, with private values and generic payo¤s, the principal
is better o¤ if she has a private signal rather than if the same signal is publicly revealed.
The intuition for that result is that, when the principal is privately informed, there could
be a pooling or semi-pooling equilibrium, in which the di¤erent types of principal provide
insurance to each other against the uncertainty created by the private information of the
agent. This statement does not hold in the (nongeneric) case of quasi-linear payo¤s. There,
the insurance motive disappears and the principal is indi¤erent between being privately
informed or committing to reveal her signal (Proposition 11).
As Maskin and Tirole point out, things change in common values. When the principal
is privately informed, there is a con‡ict of interest between the di¤erent types of principal,
which creates negative externalities. Usually, this occurs when low types have an incentive
to pretend to be high types and therefore high types must choose ine¢cient actions in order
to di¤erentiate themselves. Seen in this framework, our result does not appear surprising.
By focusing on the quasi-linear case, we kill the insurance motive. To summarize, combin-
ing Maskin and Tirole’s work with ours, we can tackle the question of whether committing
to reveal private information bene…ts the principal: In the quasi-linear private value case,
the principal is indi¤erent; In the generic private value case, the answer is negative; In the
quasi-linear common value case, the answer is positive; and …nally in the generic case with
common values, the answer is ambiguous.
There is a di¤erence between our model and Maskin and Tirole’s, which is worth
pointing out. They allow for mechanisms in which the both the principal and the agent
send a message. Their timing is as follows: (1) Principal and Agent observe private
information; (2) Principal chooses mechanism; (3) Agent accepts or rejects; (4) Principal
and Agent simultaneously choose messages. In our model, the principal cannot send a
message in stage 4. Her only action lies in the choice of the mechanism. For our purpose,
this is a realistic mechanism space. However, it would be interesting to investigate how
our results are modi…ed by using a larger mechanism space.
5. applications
An independent agency which certi…es the quality of the product of a monopolist o¤ers
a valuable service to the monopolist, provided the reports are a¢liated to the quality of
the good . Similarly, a monopolist pro…ts by committing to reveal the level of satisfaction
of other consumers. Our …ndings have important implications for experimentation and
price dynamics in models of social learning. See Ottaviani (1996) for a model of monopoly
pricing with social learning by the buyers. In this situation, the monopolist’s current
18pricing strategy a¤ects the amount of information publicly revealed to future buyers. The
consumers are learning from each other’s observable purchasing behavior, as in the models
of Banerjee (1992) and Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer, and Welch (1992). The seller a¤ects this
social learning process by its choice of a dynamic pricing strategy. In general, a patient
monopolist deviates from the myopically optimal price in order to increase the amount of
public information revealed.
The possibility of trade in Akerlof’s (1970) lemons market can be a¤ected in a non-
monotonic fashion as the information asymmetry decreases because of the public revelation
of a¢liated information. This can be easily seen in simple examples, analogous to those
constructed by Levin (1998) to compare the possibility of trade as the private information
of the informed party improves. Despite this non-monotonicity in public information of
the set of prices supporting trade, our general result guarantees that the uninformed price-
maker is necessarily better o¤ when a¢liated information is revealed publicly.
6. conclusion
Since its discovery by Milgrom and Weber (1982), the linkage principle is acquiring
a central role in models of pricing. We have shown here that its logic extends to the
classic environment of a price-discriminating monopolist selling multiple units (or single
units of heterogenous quality) of a good to a single buyer. While the principle generalizes
in some interesting directions, two negative results have been recently provided. Perry
and Reny (1999) have recently shown that the linkage principle does not generalize to
multi-unit Vickrey auctions with more than one buyer who each demands more than one
unit.3 Moscarini and Ottaviani (1998) show that the linkage principle does not hold when
competing principals sell to a the buyer with private information on the relative value of
goods.
In the monopoly problem we have studied here the buyer’s type has one dimension
only. Our proofs rely on the structure of the monopoly solution for the unidimensional
case and do not readily extend to the characterizations provided by the recent literature
on multidimensional monopoly (Armstrong (1996) and Rochet and Choné (1998)). It is
an open question whether our results extend to the multidimensional case.
In this paper we do not discuss the value for the monopolist of the private information
of the buyer. By selecting trial and return policies, the seller can often controls the
3In a Vickrey auction equilibrium, losing bids are based on underestimates of the signals of the com-
peting bidders, while winning bids on overestimates. Revelation of a¢liated public information not only
results on average in an increase of losing bids but also in a decrease of winning bids. When bidders
demands multiple units, the second e¤ect may dominate the …rst one.
19amount of private information available to the buyer when purchasing the product. Lewis
and Sappington (1995) o¤er a series of interesting examples to illustrate how the seller’s
pro…ts change as the buyer becomes better informed about the quality of the product.
In contrast to the case of public information, no general principle has yet emerged in the
comparison of situations with di¤erent buyer’s private information.
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21APPENDIX
Proof of Proposition 1
We provide the details of a revisitation in our setting of some standard results on the
reduction of the self selection (see Section 3 of Maskin and Riley’s (1984)). As the public
signal z is held …xed throughout this Appendix, we can lighten notation by omitting it.
Proposition 1 Let U(q;t) be strictly supermodular in q and t. Then: (i) q is imple-
mentable if and only if it is monotonic, q0 · ¢¢¢ · qn; (ii) Given an implementable
q, at a pro…t maximizing price vector p the local downward incentive compatibility
constraints are binding,
pi = pi¡1 + U(qi;ti) ¡ U(qi¡1;ti) 8i;
with p0 ´ 0.
This is proved by the following four results.
Lemma 3 q is implementable only if q0 · ¢¢¢ · qn.
Proof. Suppose not, i.e. qi < qk for an i > k. Supermodularity of U (with yi ¸ yk and
qi < qk) implies
U(qi;yi) + U(qk;yk) < U(qk;yi) + U(qi;yk): (19)
Implementability of q implies
U(qi;yi) + U(qk;yk) ¸ U(qk;yi) + U(qi;yk);
obtained by summing (ICi;k) and (ICk;i), in contradiction with (19). ¤
Lemma 4 Suppose q0 · ¢¢¢ · qn. Consider (q;p). If all the adjacent downward incentive
compatibility constraints ICi;i¡1 hold as equalities, then all other IC’s are satis…ed.
Proof. The statement is proven in two steps. First, we show that all upward constraints
are satis…ed, then we show that all downward constraints are satis…ed.
Proof. Step 1: (ICi;i¡1);8i ! (ICk;i);8k < i. To see this,
pi ¡ pk
= (pi ¡ pi¡1) + (pi¡1 ¡pi¡2) + ::: + (pk+1 ¡ pk)
= (U(qi;yi) ¡U(qi¡1;yi)) + (U(qi¡1;yi¡1) ¡ U(qi¡2;yi¡1)) + ::: + (U(qk+1;yk+1) ¡U(qk;yk+1))
¸ (U(qi;yk) ¡ U(qi¡1;yk)) + (U(qi¡1;yk) ¡ U(qi¡2;yk)) + ::: + (U(qk+1;yk) ¡ U(qk;yk))
= U(qi;yk) ¡ U(qk;yk);
22where the second equality is (ICi;i¡1), the strict inequality comes from supermodular-
ity (and the assumption that q is nondecreasing), and the last equality is an immediate
simpli…cation.
Step 2: (ICi;i¡1);8i ! (ICi;k);8k < i. To see this,
pi ¡ pk
= (U(qi;yi) ¡U(qi¡1;yi)) + (U(qi¡1;yi¡1) ¡ U(qi¡2;yi¡1)) + ::: + (U(qk+1;yk+1) ¡U(qk;yk+1))
· (U(qi;yi) ¡U(qi¡1;yi)) + (U(qi¡1;yi) ¡ U(qi¡2;yi)) + ::: + (U(qk+1;yi) ¡ U(qk;yi))
= U(qi;yi) ¡U(qk;yi);
where the argument is analogous to Step 1. ¤
Corollary 1 If q0 · ¢¢¢ · qn, then q is implementable.
Proof. For any q, it is always possible to construct a p such that all (ICi;i¡1) hold as
equalities. If q1 · ¢¢¢ · qn, Lemma 4 guarantees that hq;pi also satisfy the other IC’s. ¤
Corollary 2 For any implementable q, the monopolist maximizes pro…ts by making (ICi;i¡1)
binding.
Proof. Immediate from Lemmas 3 and 4. The monopolist can always increase pro…ts by
eliminating slack from (ICi;i¡1). ¤
23